This paper was delivered at Oxford University in 2000 and partly published in the following book: Chung-ying Cheng & Nicholas Bunnin (eds). Contemporary Chinese Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2002 (pp. 37-56).

Wang Guowei’s Aesthetic Thought in Perspective

Wang Keping

Around the turn of the twentieth century, China witnessed a new cultural movement that featured the influx of western ideas. It was during this ideologically hectic period that Wang Guowei (1877-1927) established himself as a pioneering scholar in fields as diverse as philosophy, aesthetics, literary criticism, Chinese history, epigraphy and ancient geography. He was also highly celebrated as a poet in the classical form of ci lyrics that had earlier flourished in the Song Dynasty (960-1279).

In his early preoccupation with aesthetics and literary criticism, Wang Guowei was inspired in part by German idealism and in part by the traditions of Chinese art. In western philosophy, he was especially influenced by Kant, Schiller, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and his revaluation of Chinese literature was marked by a preference for ci poetry. His philosophy of criticism gave a central role to the value of art. He held that even though pure art is instrumentally useless, it is crucially worthy and significant in terms of enlightenment. This is precisely because artistic works express philosophical, aesthetic, spiritual and ethical values. The philosophical dimension of art exposes the truth of human existence in both a universal and a particular sense through imagery and artistic form. Wang Guowei’s account is thus connected with Schopenhauer’s Idea as the object of knowledge or the origin of art. The aesthetic dimension of art lies in a disinterestedness that helps us to go beyond the will to live and obnoxiously secular desires and to enter an aesthetic state or serene contemplation. From this contemplative state we obtain a form of infinite delight and pleasure. The spiritual aspect of art as play expresses and releases suppressed feelings and emotions that give rise to pain and depression. By providing consolation and exoneration, art reduces the amount of suffering and meaninglessness experienced in human life. In its ethical aspect, art is like a boat sheltering us in the bitter sea and frees us from the worldly anxieties. Art aims not simply to depict the misery of the human world, but also to seek to indicate that certain alternatives are available through self-enlightenment to assist victims in extricating themselves from the human predicament.

These four aspects of artistic value thread their way, explicitly or implicitly, as essential components through the whole of Wang Guowei’s aesthetic pondering. For Wang, they parallel six cardinal doctrines: meiyu shuo (aesthetic education), jietuo shuo (spiritual detachment), youxi shuo (art as play), tiancai shuo (the artist as genius), guya shuo (the refined) and jingjie shuo (the poetic state). In his theoretical speculations, Wang Guowei hovered over the vast territory of Chinese culture with conceptual wings borrowed from the West. His aesthetic scholarship was grounded in his native heritage, but greatly benefited from his ability to stand astride both eastern and western cultures.

Beyond East and West: An Intercultural Transformation

Wang Guowei’s positive attitude towards both native and foreign culture, which is noticeable throughout his early writings, can be attributed to his insight into the universal nature of all forms of learning. He held that this nature is oriented towards truth by virtue of both scientific analysis and factual justification. He sought an intercultural standpoint that would disentangle him from any one-sided views. His chief motive for this strategy derived partially from his intention to reconstruct the Chinese cultural legacy and partially from his conviction that flourishing academic studies in a global sense must rely on the further progress through honest and unbiased investigations within significant existing cultures. Thus he affirmed the necessity of ‘going beyond any prejudiced preference or distinction (xue wu zhongxi，学无中西) in sincere multicultural explorations’ that recognised the intellectual diversity in the history of thought (Wang 1905 “Lun Jinnian Zhi Xueshujie” [About Academic Society in Recent Years]). A more detailed argument was expressed in the following:

The nature of learning has nothing to do with the so-called discrepancy between the modern and the classical, the western and Chinese, or the useless and the useful. Why is this so? The investigation of things in the world leads to different conclusions if considered from the perspectives of science or history. However, it all aims to seek truth from facts…Human knowledge the world over is basically contained in such disciplines as science, history and literary studies which categorically exist in both China and western nations. They only vary in their degree of width, roughness, superficiality or elaboration. In plain words, any biased discrimination between the two cultures is definitely groundless. For it originated in senseless worries that the imagined aftermath of the flourishing of western culture in China would prevent and impede the evolution of Chinese culture or vice versa. China is, as it were, exempt from such worries, but lacks real and substantial scholarship. Thus in Beijing, the capital and cultural centre of the country, there are no more than ten scholars of great learning in the field of Chinese classical studies. As for those who are engaged in the study of western culture, most tend to scratch the surface and hardly master either its profound spirit or broad scope. We cannot name even one or two figures for their devotion to the target subject and compare them with those who devote their lifetime to the learning of the Chinese classics…. I personally maintain that Chinese and western studies par excellence can interact on and promote each other to the extent that they thrive and decline in a synchronous fashion. That is to say, one can not do without the other in terms of their respective rise and fall. This is especially so in the case of the contemporary world and learning (Wang 1911 “Guoxue Congkan Xu” [Foreword to The Journal of Chinese Studies]. Note: All quotations from Wang are from Wang 1997 as translated by the author of this chapter.)

Wang’s cultural openness and tolerance were grounded on observation. For instance, he held that the Chinese language features ambiguity in meaning and that Chinese modes of thought therefore appear logically weaker than ways of thought fostered by western languages. Western cultural identity places greater emphasis on scientific speculation and hence has greater capacity for abstraction and classification. As a result, generalisation and specification are two strategies that are widely applied in the West to both visible and invisible nature. They are in Wang’s mind well manifested in Kant’s analyses of reason and Schopenhuaer’s formulation of sufficient reason. In contrast, the identity of the Chinese people lies in a pragmatic or instrumental dimension. In theoretical pursuits, they tend to be easily contented with common factual knowledge and are reluctant to get down to the bottom of things. Consequently, the theoretical specification of things is rarely practised unless it is imposed by practical needs. (Wang 1905 “Lun Xinxueyu Zhi Shuru” [On the New Terminology Imported from the West]).

To verify his observation, he attempted to employ a strategy of intercultural transformation to handle three basic issues in Chinese philosophy, namely the questions of xing (human nature), li (principle) and ming (fate). He used Kantian epistemology as distinguished between a priori and a posteriori to discuss the possibility of escaping a dualistic trap that results from dichotomising human nature in terms of good and evil. According to his statement in Lun Xing (On Human Nature), the knowledge a priori is based on theoretical hypotheses while its counterpart a posteriori is based on empirical observations and relevant cases. In Chinese understandings and doctrines of human nature, the perspective a priori gives rise to two opposite views: one maintains that all humans are innately good by nature, and it is the environment and learning a posteriori that makes the difference between the evil and the good among people. The other holds that all humans are innately evil by nature, and it is through education and enculturation that make them become good. The former is represented by Confucius whereas the latter by Xun Zi. Similarly, the perspective a posteriori also leads to two reverse positions regarding human nature in light of good and evil. They are all, when compared with one another, dramatically contradictory both a priori and a posteriori in one sense, and in the other, “beyond human knowledge” due to the agnostic characteristic of xing as human nature. This agnosticism drives at such a conclusive remark: “Good-naturedness and evil-naturedness are antithetical to each other as they are empirically revealed in human deeds. Both of them could be tenable only if they happen to coincide with their corresponding evidences. But it is not reliable to infer human nature in general from sheer experience. (For experience does not reflect the origin of human nature.) When human nature is talked out of human nature alone, there arises a kind of absolute monism in terms of either good or evil. It could be tenable only if it is conceived of as something non-empirical. For contradictions and paradoxes would come up once it is applied to justifying experiences or personality cultivation pertaining to the dichotomy of good and evil. Hence I have deliberately pointed out this fact in the hope that young scholars in China will save up their breath and energy by not engaging themselves in such fruitless discussion of human nature.” (Wang 1904 “Lun Xing” [On Human Nature])

By the same token Wang also examined li in relation to the Schopenhuaerian principle of “sufficient reason” and the Kantian distinction between “pure reason” and “practical reason”. He thereby assumed that li in its narrow sense means liyou (causal reason) and in its wider sense means lixing (intellectual reason). Of the two basic meanings of li, “the former suggests the universal form of human knowledge while the latter denotes the function of the relationship between the fabricating of ideas and the defining of ideas. It is a kind of intellectual power…Furthermore, li as an object of knowledge, it contains both metaphysical values (i.e. zhen, truth) and ethical values (i.e. shan, goodness). For zhen as truth and shan as goodness remained undifferentiated in ancient Chinese thought. This is self-evident in Zhu Xi’s conception of tianli (heavenly principles). (Wang 1904 “Shi Li” [Interpreting the Notion of Li]). In addition, Wang compared the conventional Chinese interpretation of ming with the Western concepts of fatalism and causal laws, even though he rejected the assumptions underlying the problem of free will and determinism. On this point he accepted Zhu Xi’s analysis of the interconnection between ming (fate), xing (human nature) and li (truth or principles of multivalues), and eventually drew a practically moral responsibility or sense of mission from it. (Wang 1906 “Yuan Ming” [The Original Fate])

Here there are a number of things worth mentioning. First and foremost, Wang’s intercultural perspective never failed him to detect some of the fundamentally dissimilar aspects of Chinese and Western cultures. The native culture places more stress on personal cultivation and moral virtues that can harmonise human relations and sustain social stability, whilst the Western counterpart emphasises power and right, which are suitable for the conquest of nature and the conquest of other human beings. From his intercultural standpoint, Wang held that all these features can be gathered together to establish a complimentary relationship of great significance.

Secondly, although he insisted on the need to learn from the West, he was neither a social activist nor a revolutionary. He remained a single-minded academic and an earnest advocate of interculturalism throughout his life. He succeeded in avoiding the relatively superficial debates about cultural preference and the political instrumentalism of his time, and served as a cultural bridge between the first wave of Westernization that was launched by the generation preceding him and the New Cultural Movement that was unleashed by a group of radical intellectuals around the time of May 4^th Movement in 1919.

Thirdly, his new approach to historical studies, however, also embodied intercultural features and was termed “a methodology of double proof” (erchong zhengju fa). It benefited from his previous commitments both to German idealism and to his unique inheritance of the Chinese philological tradition that flourished in the Qing dynasty. In practice it was derived from the three interrelated features as aforementioned, say, mutual interpretation and attestation by comparing unearthed relics with relevant historical records, reciprocal supplementation and correction by comparing old books of other ethnic groups with existing classics in China, and bilateral consultation and justification by using western concepts and sources available from Chinese literature. (Chen Yinque, 1934). Take his etymological study of the Chinese character xun for example. He applied his double-proof approach by “searching through all the oracle records available” (bian sou buci) and meanwhile looking into such classics as the Yi Jing (The Book of Change) and the Shuo Wen (The Dictionary of Ancient Chinese Characters ). When conducting reciprocal interpretation and attestation between the former as new historical documents unearthed and the latter as old historical literature existent, he went so far as to seek authentic evidences in antique sacrificial vessels and their inscriptions to identify the contextual usage of the character concerned, and re-justify the possible interpretations attained. So convincingly he concluded that xun as“a ten-day period”related to tiangan (The Heavenly Stems) could be traced back to the Yin Dynasty (approx. B.C.) when it was deployed to tell fortunes. (Wang 1918 “Shi Xun”[Interpreting Xun as a Ten-day Period])

Finally, Wang’s concern for western culture as a whole was marked by a passionate desire to introduce and promote German idealism, emphasising its account of life (ethics) and art (aesthetics). He did this selectively in accord with his observation and understanding, and his Chinese sensibility and expression modified the doctrines he received. In aesthetic criticism of Chinese literary texts, for example, he adopted and extended idealist concepts such as disinterested contemplation, aesthetic play, will to live, genius, the beautiful and the sublime, the pure subject, serene contemplation and the contrast between realism and idealism. As a result, he put forward his theory of six cardinal doctrines that not simply comprise the structure of his philosophy of aesthetic criticism, but exemplify his capacity for intercultural transformation, if not creative misinterpretation.

Aesthetic Education as a Critical Necessity (meiyu shuo)

The Western notion of aesthetic education (meiyu) was first introduced to China by Wang Guowei and then more effectively promoted by Cai Yuanpei (1868-1940). Both were convinced that the declining institutions of old China could be reconstructed and revived by means of modern education. They emphasized the integral wholeness of education in its physical, intellectual, moral and aesthetic dimensions. They enthusiastically advocated the importance of the aesthetic dimension, drawing their inspiration from German idealism and especially from Friedrich Schiller. However, Wang Guowei’s impact was restricted to the circle of academic research whereas Cai Yuanpei’s influence reached the operation of institutions and even spilt over into the society at large. Cai Yuanpei took advantage of his role as a front-line administrator and renowned educator who led the administrative renovation of Peking University to spread his ideas. He was especially known for his slogan of “replacing religion with aesthetic education”. In the light of Chinese conditions at the time, Wang Guowei and Cai Yuanpei intended aesthetic education to reshape the obsolete educational paradigm in China and to remould national identity. More precisely, they sought to plant the seeds of spiritual freedom in the soil of superstition and misery, to cultivate creativity and wholeness by minimizing the excessive emphasis on rote memory work and one-sided learning, and to nourish a popular concern for good taste and human dignity in order to combat social ills such as opium addiction and wanton pleasure-seeking.

As early as 1903, Wang Guowei wrote:

“What is the philosophy of education? It is to develop the whole personality. What could such a personality be? It is the outcome of the all-round and harmonious development of human capabilities. These capabilities can be divided into two basic categories: One is physical, and the other is spiritual. One cannot become a whole being if his physical powers are strengthened whereas his spiritual counterpart weakened, or vice versa. Human wholeness must be well and harmoniously developed in both physical and spiritual aspects. In respect of the latter, it can be subdivided into three elements, namely, the cognitive, the emotional and the volitional, which in turn correspond to the ideals of the true, the good and the beautiful. The true is the ideal target of cognitive pursuit, the beautiful is that of the emotional pursuit, and the good is that of the volitional pursuit. A whole personality cannot do without these three virtues of truth, beauty and goodness. Such an actualization inevitably depends on education. Therefore, the enterprise of education in its entirety consists of three such components: the intellectual, the moral (i.e. volitional) and the aesthetic...With these three subdivisions proceeding in parallel and moving step by step towards the fulfilment of the three ideals, and with physical education added, there surely arises the feasibility of developing whole personalities and accomplishing all educational functions.” (Wang 1903 “Jiaoyu Zhi Zongzhi” [About the General Objectives of Education])

Because he was committed to the underlying benefits of aesthetic education, Wang Guowei strongly recommended its importance in many of his publications. In his critical comments on an influential proposal for a nation-wide educational program in 1906, he urged that aesthetics as a discipline be offered to students in both humanities and engineering. (Wang 1906 “Zouding Jingxueke Daxue Wenxueke Daxue Zhangcheng Shu Hou” [Critique of the Proposed Program and Curriculum for Advanced Education in China])

He argued that aesthetics could help to develop a sound cognitive structure and broad academic perspective in addition to enhancing aesthetic judgment and personal cultivation. In his discussion of how to deal with the mental torture of endless boredom and opium addiction, he again gave priority to the aesthetic contemplation of works of art, such as sculpture, painting, music and literature.

Wang Guowei gave three main reasons for the value of aesthetic contemplation in dealing with addiction. He argued that opium addiction was caused not only by political failure, low education and national poverty, but more fundamentally by frustration, hopelessness and lives devoid of meaning. In this respect, he considered it to be an emotional disease that could subjugate a nation. It could be cured neither by dry science nor by rigid morality. Instead, a cure had to work by emotional means. The solution to opium addiction lay in treating the emotions through religion and art as well as in sound civic politics and universal cognitive and moral education. Both religion and art could provide catharsis and mental consolation. While religion offered what is idealistic and pointed to the future, art offered what is realistic and related to the present. Among all the genres of art, literature touched human emotion and the human condition most powerfully. Accordingly, a sincere love of literature could provide many benefits. It could help to appease the pain of boredom by giving some meaning to life, and it could prevent one from sinking into base activities by spiritually enriching one’s inner world. (Wang 1907 “Qudu Pian” [On Getting Rid of the Opium Problem])

The second reason to employ aesthetic contemplation in dealing with addiction can be found in Wang’s examination of human activities. (Wang 1907 “Renjian Shihao Zhi Yanjiu” [A Study of Human Hobbies]). In this discussion, he distinguished between positive and negative pain. Positive pain is generally experienced in necessary activities like daily work. Negative pain arises from too much leisure or the pursuit of unnecessary pastimes (xiao qian). In order to divert themselves from the negative pain of boredom, people seek activities to “kill time”. Different persons pursue different activities. Some activities may be healthy and noble, such as the pursuit of truth through reading or the enjoyment of beauty and grace in calligraphy, painting and antiques. Some activities may be pretentious and vain, such as the acquisition and ostentatious display of art works that are possessed merely as symbols of private wealth. Other activities may be vulgar and base, such as taking opium or the pursuit of sensuous pleasure in brothels. The love of art and literature provides the basis for the most decent activities and is highly recommended because of its special value. As he calims,

“The psychical drive goes in either this direction or that one. If it is not guided toward noble hobbies, it will be unavoidably attached to other despicable ones. In the provision of spiritual consolation and emotional release, nothing can be more relevant and efficacious than a real taste of arts such as sculpture, painting, music and literature, etc.” (Wang 1907 “Qudu Pian” [On Getting Rid of the Opium Problem]).

Finally, Wang Guowei promoted aesthetic education in the specific historical and social context of China. The school curriculum paid little attention to aesthetic education through literature and art. Rather, it focused on political instrumentalism or ideological orthodoxy under the guise of moral teaching. As a result, Chinese literature, according to Wang Guowie, could not match Western literature, and public taste was inadequately developed due to these inadequacies. As a result, the mass of the population had a morbid state of mind that turned them to addiction to the base pleasures of opium, gambling, food or sex. Aesthetic education could be supported as a critical necessity for refining and uplifting the national spirit (Wang 1904 “Jiaoyu Ougan Size” [Four Random Thoughts on Education in China]).

Characteristically, Wang Guowei held that aesthetic education could be effective in improving human life:

“With the human mind unexceptionally fettered by self-interests, the beautiful alone enables humans to forget personal gains or losses and enter a meaningful kingdom of great purity as well as happiness…In the final analysis, aesthetic education as such assists humans to enhance their emotions and to realize their wish for self-perfection. Meanwhile, it serves as a means for both moral and intellectual education…For the cognitive, emotional and volitional dimensions of mind are not separated but interrelated…These three aspects work in parallel and gradually move toward the actualization of ideals such as truth, goodness and beauty.” (Wang 1906 “Shu Jinshi Jiaoyu Sixiang Yu Zhexue Zhi Guanxi” [Of the Interrelations between Modern Thoughts on Education and Philosophy])

This argument was linked to his acceptance of Kant’s analyses of the cognitive, emotional and volitional aspects of mind. This acceptance of Kantian analyses was extended by Wang Guowei’s consideration of the interrelations between modern education and philosophy. In addition, this discussion was foreshadowed by Schiller’s notion of the aesthetic state (dem asthetischen Zustand): “a middle disposition in which sense and reason are both active at the same time”. In other words, “This middle disposition, in which the psyche is subject neither to physical nor to moral constraint, and yet is active in both these ways, pre-eminently deserves to be called a free disposition.” (Schiller, 1967) Schiller elaborated his account of the aesthetic state in the 24th letter On the Aesthetic Education of Man as an indispensable link between physical and moral state. According to Schiller, “Man in his physical state merely suffers the dominion of nature; he emancipates himself from the dominion in the aesthetic state, and he acquires mastery over it in the moral.” (Schiller, 1967, p. 172) A similar expression was available in the 27th letter where the aesthetic state (dem asthetische Staat) was seen to be the bridge between the dynamic state of rights (dem dynamischen Staat der Rechte) and the ethical state of duties (dem ethische Staat der Pflichten). (Schiller ,1967, pp. 213-219) Schiller proclaimed that when a man attains the aesthetic state:

“Beauty alone can confer upon him a social character. Taste alone brings harmony into society, because it fosters harmony in the individual. All other forms of perception divide man, because they are founded exclusively either upon the sensuous or upon the spiritual part of his being; only the aesthetic mode of perception makes of him a whole, because both his natures must be in harmony if he is to achieve it.” (Schiller 1967, p. 215)

In virtually all of his writings on aesthetic education, Wang Guowei cited Schiller, but with this inspiration for his own analyses, he continued to recognize Confucianism as the keystone of the Chinese cultural legacy. With a specific reference to the remarks of Confucius on poetry, rites, music and landscapes of mountains and waters, Wang Guowei was the first to assert:

“The Confucian way of teaching starts and ends in aesthetic education. It thus leads to the personality of the gentleman (junzi renge), amounting to either ‘the beautiful soul’ (Schiller) or ‘the pure subject of knowledge’. (Schopenhauer) The state of mind at this level is free from expectations, fears, inner struggle, interestedness and egoism. It therefore self-conscientiously conforms to moral imperatives without any feeling of being coerced by any rules… Hence whoever is concerned about education must put this aspect into full consideration.” (Wang 1904 “Kongzi Zhi Meiyu Zhuyi” [Confucius’s Aesthetic Educationism])

This assertion is backed by relevant quotations from The Confucian Analects (Lun Yu). For example, “[The personal cultivation of junzi as the superior man] is evoked by poetry, made firm by rites and completed by music.” (Lun Yu, VIII:8) Wang Guowei applied his account of Confucian teaching to suggest that music, both vocal and non-vocal, be taught in primary schools, with materials selected from the rich resources of classical Chinese poetry. This teaching would have three major functions: harmonising the emotions, moulding the temperament and the will and ameliorating the faculty of hearing as well as the vocal organs. (Wang 1907 “Lun Xiaoxuexiao Changgeke Zhi Cailiao” [On the Subject Matter of Vocal Music in Primary Schools])

Like Prometheus, Wang Guowei “stole the flame” of German idealism and tried to use it to ignite a fire of aesthetic education in China. We can understand the positive motivation for his conviction that aesthetic education could be used as a means of enlightenment to solve the social problems and spiritual crises of his age. His account of the psychology of the Chinese people and his critical anatomy of their morbid pastimes displayed many insights. His rediscovery of the Confucian approach to aesthetic education by means of poetry and music was noteworthy and provocative. His prescription of aesthetic education as a remedy for the social ills that he analyzed, however, was wishful thinking in the harsh circumstances of all the sectors of Chinese society. His claims for the practical benefits of aesthetic education were arbitrary and exaggerated. Through his romantic vision, Wang Guowei held out great hopes for aesthetic education, but in the conditions facing China these hopes could not be realized.

Art as a Refuge from Suffering (jietuo shuo)

Chinese philosophy of life assumes the truth of aphorisms such as “human existence is saturated with hardship and misery” (hanxin ruku) and “the life of men is troubled and short” (rensheng kuduan). Early Daoists like Laozi warned that “Man’s biggest trouble is no more than having a body” (ren zhi dahuan, mo guo youshen). The body is the origin of our desires. Similarly, Zhuangzi regarded “the situation of men enslaved by external things” (ren wei wuyi) to be the basic cause of the misery of the human condition. This enslavement resulted in human acquisitiveness and possessiveness regarding objects and pleasures that lie outside the true value of life. For the sake of extricating us from suffering, Laozi advised that we should “live in detachment” (yanchu chaoran) either by “reducing selfishness and desires” (shaosi guayu) or by “acting instead of competing for gains” (wei er buzheng). Zhuangzi encouraged people to “be spring with all things” (yu wu wei chun) through “free and easy wandering” (xiaoyao you) for spiritual emancipation and personal independence. This advice fostered among Chinese literati a spiritual inclination to take refuge in the silent beauty of the landscape as well as in the beauty of works of art and encouraged the naturalistic quietism that has enjoyed a long tradition in China. Like Zhuangzi, who compared life to a tumour and death to the breaking of the tumour, Sakyamuni, the Buddha, saw life as the fountainhead of all cares and worries because it was filled with desires. The Buddha instructed victims of such a life to sail a boat of wisdom from this word to the realm of nirvana. In a nihilistic manner, the Buddha sought to persuade us to see life as an illusion and the human world as the veil of Maya. This doctrine led to the mysteries of meditation as an exercise to attain mental purity or renunciation of an egoism that is filled with greed and worldly cares.

These ideas were all too familiar to Wang Guowei as a consequence of his bitter experience, his poor health and his philosophical preoccupation with human condition (Wang 1907 “Zixu” [A Brief Autobiography]). He portrayed life in terms of care and toil. His picture of life turned out to be even darker through being shrouded in absolute despair. This despair grew from his own retrospection and experience, but also reflected the impact of Schopenhauer’s negative pessimism as well as the influence of Chinese Daoism and Buddhism.

“Care and toil accompany life all along. Nevertheless, everyone wants to live even though he hates both care and toil... In the process of living, one has a drive to self-preservation: when hungry, he wants food; when thirsty, he wants drink; when cold, he wants clothes; when living in the open air, he wants a shelter…Sometimes he has sexual desire and therefore gets married and takes up household chores and family duties… The nature of life lies deep in desire. Desire comes from insufficiency. The case of insufficiency leads to pain or suffering. A desire vanishes when fulfilled. Yet, a fulfilled desire is usually one out of ten or a hundred unfulfilled desires. Worse still, a satisfied desire gives rise to another and another in a chain. Hence, consolation in the end is in no way attainable. Even when all desires are satisfied and there are no more objects to be desired, boredom and weariness naturally arises...In this case, human life is made to swing like a pendulum between pain and boredom. Boredom in its actuality is looked upon as another type of pain. What can help get rid of these two negative feelings is so-called happiness. In order to pursue happiness, one has to make painstaking efforts, which are again in turn reduced to pain. Furthermore, the sense of pain is frequently intensified after a momentary experience of happiness. There are pains that remain as what they are without reverting to the lived experience of happiness, but there is hardly any happiness that is not preceded or followed by suffering pain. The degree of pain increases rather than decreases as world civilization progresses. Why is this so? As civilization progresses, the range of knowledge widens, the number of desires multiplies and the sense of pain deepens On this account, the nature of life is none other than pain: desire, life and pain can be taken as a trinity… Nevertheless, there is something that can lift us above utilitarian interests and make us oblivious of subject-object relations. On these occasions, the mind is freed from any expectations or fears because the person is no longer the subject of desire but is the pure subject of knowledge… Now he is free and at ease. He is like a boat that is floating near its homeport after escaping a rough sea, … like a fish that has slipped alive through a net or like a bird that has flown out of its cage. It is as though he were starting to enjoy a happy excursion in beautiful mountains and forests, along picturesque rivers or over blue oceans. This something that enables him to be detached from interests is presupposed by its disinterested connection with him. In plain language, this is possible only when we consider art instead of anything practically material or physical…. Those who are desire-ridden cannot contemplate a work of art, and, conversely, those who can contemplate it are free from desires. The beautiful in art is therefore superior to its counterpart in nature because it enables the viewer easily to forget subject-object relations… So Goethe poetically uttered: ‘What in life doth only grieve us; that in art we gladly see’. Here gladness lies in oblivion to the subject-object ties of utility.” (Wang 1904 “Honglou Meng Pinglun” [A Review of The Dream of the Red Chamber])

Noticeably Wang Guowei reinterpreted Schopenhauer’s account of the effects of “the will to live”, “the vanity and suffering of life” and “the pure subject of knowledge”, even though he employed minor modifications in Chinese expression. Schopenhauer’s view of art as a means of spiritual freedom derived from the capacity of an artwork to facilitate our becoming “the pure subject of knowledge”. The artwork is a perceived object that “lies entirely outside the province of things which are capable of having a relation to the will, because it is nothing real, but a mere picture”. It is picturesque, an event of actual life that is rendered poetical, such as the singing of a blithe morning, a beautiful evening or a still moonlight night. Its effect is “conditioned by indifference, will-less, and thereby a purely objective apprehension” or “the complete silence of the will, which leaves the man simply the pure subject of knowledge”. The will vanishes from consciousness, the peace of heart enters and the intuitive apprehension of Ideas is attained, and so is aesthetic satisfaction. Finally, “individuality also, with it its suffering and misery, is really abolished.” (Schopenhauer, 1964, vol. 3, pp. 126-137)

Again following Schopenhauer’s path of thought, Wang Guowei made great demands on art. Schopenhauer announced that the fine arts were fundamental to the solution of the problem of existence and that every artwork aimed to show life and things as they are in truth (Schopenhauer, 1964, vol. 3, pp. 176-177). Wang Guowei reconfirmed that fine arts aimed to illustrate the suffering of life and the Dao of extricating us from this suffering; artworks were thus intended to save human beings from the spiritual shackles of this world and to free them from conflict with the desire to live in order to achieve temporary peace (Wang 1904 “Honglou Meng Pinglun” [A Review of The Dream of the Red Chamber]). However, Wang Guowei did not derive his individual observations from sceptical thought, but developed them by exposing both the aesthetic and ethical values of art. For Wang Guowei, these two kinds of values become significant only through living in the troubled situation in an imperfect world. They are meant to free people from the desire to live and to allow them to enter the realm of pure knowledge. These values are thus interconnected in their orientation towards exoneration: freeing us from the burden of the suffering of life.

Taking The Dream of the Red Chamber as a culturally central example, Wang Guowei asserted that the novel was a tragedy in which every character is tied to the desire to live and is deeply entangled in the mire of suffering. It is authentic in its description of daily events, profound in its exposure of the human condition, and completely different from all the other works of Chinese romance, which without exception lead to a happy ending. Furthermore, its style is antagonistic to the inclination to joy in the mentality of the Chinese people; the entire progression of the story is saturated with an explicit or hidden tragic atmosphere. It enacts the claim that all the misery of life springs from the drive of egoism and that the solution to the problems of life has to be sought in the self. This solution is a spiritual exoneration from the burdens of misery and lies in abstaining from the secular world rather than in ending life through suicide. One who renounces the world rejects all the cravings of life because he knows that life as such cannot escape from misery. In contrast, a suicide still abides by the cravings and ends his life because he is crushed down by despair. (Wang 1904 “Honglou Meng Pinglun” [A Review of The Dream of the Red Chamber])

The Dream of the Red Chamber displays two possibilities in the process of spiritual exoneration. The first is realized by contemplating the suffering of others, and the second is through an awareness of one’s own suffering. Both ways awaken people to the truth of life: the former is possible for those who have extraordinary powers of understanding, while the latter is available to those who are ordinary in this regard. Through their unusual perception and wisdom, the extraordinary obtain insight into the universality of life afflicted with suffering and in their search for spiritual emancipation break away from their desire to live. The ordinary are subject to a succession of miserable encounters that stem from a repeated circle of intensified but unsatisfied desires and are consequently trapped in hopeless circumstances. Nevertheless, they gradually realize the truth in the universality of life and come to long for spiritual extrication. With their dispositions changed and their desires abandoned, they transcend both the hell of suffering and the paradise of joy.

The extraordinary way of spiritual exoneration may still be confronted from time to time by the will to live, and this confrontation produces illusions or visions. The ordinary way of exoneration is like a bronze cooking vessel that is forged in the furnace of life over the fire of suffering. It is the outcome of becoming tired of life and therefore is freed forever from the will to live and its related illusions. In Wang Guowei’s terminology, “The former type of exoneration is supernatural and mysterious whereas the latter is natural and human. Furthermore, one is religious and peaceful, and the other artistic, tragic and sublime.” (Wang 1904 “Honglou Meng Pinglun” [A Review of The Dream of the Red Chamber])

In Jia Baoyu, the hero of The Dream of Red Chamber, Wang Guowei found the symbolic embodiment of the ordinary way of seeking spiritual freedom from one’s troubled life. He idealized this way as the ultimate solution to the problem of human existence, without regard to the gap between literary invention and living reality or to subsequent questions about the validity of this solution. Quite paradoxically, his argument for human salvation through art was upset by his sceptical pondering over the following aspects. First, the spiritual exoneration of an individual does not necessarily mean the spiritual exoneration of mankind as a whole, even though individuals and mankind as a whole are supposed to share by nature a similar will to live. Secondly, ever since Sakyamuni, who demonstrated how to gain access to nirvana, and Christ, who sacrificed himself for the salvation of mankind, the desire to live has never vanished for a moment among human beings or any other species. (Wang 1904 “Honglou Meng Pinglun” [A Review of The Dream of the Red Chamber])

Finally, Wang Guowei followed Schopenhauer in glorifying the value of art as an object of pure knowledge and thus cut art off from any practical relations. Even though he was conscious of Zhuangzi’s “usefulness of the useless” (wuyong zhi yong), there was a contradiction between the claimed disinterested quality of art and the social expectation that art would function to remedy social ills. Further, there was a paradox between Wang Guowei’s word and deed, as shown in his tragic decision to drown himself in spite of his firm rejection of suicide as a way of spiritual exoneration and his claim that art provided the means to free oneself from the miseries of life.

Art as Aesthetic Play for Freedom (youxi shuo)

In modern literary studies of China, the theory of play occupies a notable position, as exemplified in the contemporary artistic slogan “bimo youxi” (play with brush and ink). Wang Guowei was the first advocate of this doctrine of aesthetic play in China. In 1906, he claimed:

“Literature is nothing but an enterprise of play. When a man has more energy than he uses in the struggle for survival, he will apply the surplus to joyous play…When growing into adulthood, he is no longer content with the form of play he rejoiced in during childhood and is liable to describe and express what he observes and feels in order to release the exuberant energy stored up within him. That is why the culture of any nation cannot do without literature during its progression at a certain level. Naturally he who is merely plunged into the struggle for survival is by no means qualified to become a man of letters.” (Wang 1906 “Wenxue Xiao Yan” [Notes on Literature])

Such a person is too exhausted and engaged in struggle, to have either any surplus energy or any impulse to play as the underlying motivation for artistic creation. In 1907, Wang Guowei reaffirmed this view in an analysis of human activities. (Wang 1907 “Renjian Shihao Zhi Yanjiu” [A Study of Human Hobbies]) He adopted the thesis of play (youxi shuo) as a new key to the nature of art. The origin of this account can be traced to two major sources. The first was Kant’s “division of the beautiful arts”, through which the third category of art (music) was broadly defined as “the art of the beautiful play of sensations” or as a “free play of sensations” that “proceeds from bodily sensations to aesthetic ideas”. (Kant, 1951, pp.168-181) The second was Friedrich Schiller’s further elaboration of “aesthetic surplus” (asthetische Zugabe) and “aesthetic play” (asthetischen Spiele). (Schiller, 1967, pp. 205-209)

Wang Guowei simplified Schiller’s doctrine of play and contributed little to it at the level of theory. The significance of his use lay instead in his purpose of “fetching a stone from other mountains for its toughness to tackle jade”, that is in his employment of Schiller’s theory to throw light on problems within Chinese literature. Because of his concern for the freedom of aesthetic play, he condemned political interference as a handicap to literary development in China. Such interference comes into effect, for example, when literature is required to beautify reality or to promote a programme of governance for the communal good. In these cases, literature is deprived of its independent values and degenerates into decoration or propaganda. In addition, Wang Guowei attacked the dominance of moral didacticism over the creative values of literary works. He saw that the ideological instrumentalism of such political and moral expectations of art ruin not only the imagination and creativity of the artist, but also the taste of the public. It also promotes utilitarian-minded writers who produce works only for cash or for other personal benefits. In this context, Wang introduced the theory of play into China in order to fulfill three intentions. First, art as the free aesthetic play of beauty should become independent of any form of political instrumentalism. Secondly, art should perform effectively as a means of “hidden education in an appealing form” (yujiao yule) by disentangling itself from mere moral instruction. Thirdly, a genuine artist must embrace a non-utilitarian view of art in order to free himself from any external compulsion. If these intentions were not fulfilled, creativity would be strangled and Chinese literature would be prevented from attaining the full development of literature in the West.

The Artist as Creative Genius (tiancai shuo)

Wang Guowei thought that pure philosophy was rare and the fine arts were underdeveloped in Chinese culture because of the priority given to political ideology and the dominance of moral orthodoxy. He became disillusioned with trends that continued the demand that philosophy and art serve political and moral ends.

“The most sacred and noble of all that is in the world are philosophy and art. Even though they are considered ‘useless’ in a practical sense, their values are not decreased at all… For they aim at everlasting instead of temporary truth. In this regard, a philosopher strives to discover truth, and an artist to express it via symbols, thus making historically permanent achievements… Therefore, as a result of years of study, they will be much happier than the king the moment that they either capture a sudden understanding of the truth of the universe and life or obtain a wonderful expression of an elusive image in literature, painting or sculpture. All this shows the development of their natural gifts.” (Wang 1905 “Lun Zhexuejia Yu Meishujia Zhi Tianzhi” [On the Bounden Duties of Philosophers and Artists])

In this context, “natural gifts” are the talents that belong to genius (tiancai). In agreement with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Wang Guowei spoke of genius in terms of intellect, sensibility, understanding, spirit, tolerance, and creativity. He maintained that although a genius and an ordinary man may look and live alike, they differ not only quantitatively in terms of their capacities, but also qualitatively in their manner of thinking and feeling. In similar environments, the genius distinguishes himself from the ordinary man by a distinctive and insightful view of life and the world. When subject to the same pressures and predicaments, the genius knows what the ordinary man cannot know and demands what the ordinary man dares not demand. The level of genius is in direct proportion to the power of intellect and volition and the degree of suffering. A genius is more sensitive and observant regarding the problem of existence. He is apt to suffer more from pain and is sure to search for the way of consolation. He looks upon himself as a king or lord and looks down on humble or small men. He sings the song of free will and laughs at all tragedies. (Wang 1904 “Shubenhua Nicai” [Of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche]) This conception of genius as an intellectual and creative aristocracy was drawn from Schopenhauer’s discussion of genius (“On Genius”, in Schopenhauer 1897, pp. 129-149) and Nietzsche’s distinction between “the overman” and “the small man”. (Thus Spake Zarathustra in Nietzsche 1976 pp.279-84)

Wang Guowei placed great emphasis on the role of genius in the production of art. He there asserted,

“Literature consists in at least two key elements: one is jing (scene, event) and the other qing (feeling, affection). The former mainly describes the facts of nature and life whereas the latter concerns human attitudes toward the spirit of the facts. Therefore, the former is objective and cognitive while the latter is subjective and emotional. One who has a broad and purified mind is able to contemplate and experience things deeply… In short, literature is the fruit of cognitive and emotional communication. One cannot succeed in literature unless he enjoys sharp observation and profound feeling. Hence he cannot be taught via other ways to be a writer precisely because literary creation is nothing but the consequence of the play of genius.” (Wang 1906 “Wenxue Xiao Yan” [Notes on Literature])

Elsewhere, Wang Guowei followed Kant in arguing that “beautiful art is only possible as a production of genius” and subsequently asserted this claim as “the established rule of art in the past century or so ever since Kant”. (Wang 1907 “Guya Zhi Zai Meixue Shang Zhi Weizhi” [The Position of Classical Gracefulness in Aesthetics]) He rejected the value of imitation and endorsed Kant’s view that originality and exemplariness are the most important properties of genius. Wang Guowei’s thought was directly linked to Kant’s elucidation of genius in The Critique of Judgment. (Kant 1951, pp. 151-161) He thus applied his account of genius to Chinese literature:

“The most outstanding of all Chinese poets are Qu Yuan, Tao Qian, Du Fu and Su Shi. They are not only bestowed with poetic talents, but also have lofty personalities to be cherished in history A writer without noble and great personality cannot produce any noble and great works. It is often the case that a literary genius is so rare that he emerges once in decades or several centuries, and hereby ought to be nourished via cultivation and guided by virtues in order to produce really great literature.” (Wang 1906 “Wenxue Xiao Yan” [Notes on Literature])

As shown in the above statement, Wang’s conception of genius differed somewhat from both the Kantian and the Schopenhauerian views of genius. He gave greater emphasis to moral and cultural cultivation. This is very likely due to the Chinese educational tradition, according to which genius is fulfilled through the constant cultivation of personality and judgment. The moral aspect of personality is embodied in the actualization of virtues such as sincerity, humanity, righteousness, grace, intellect, honesty, loyalty, devotion and courage. The cultural dimension of judgment is then perfected through a process of continuous learning. Using examples from poetry, Wang Guowei divided the process into three stages:

“Throughout the ages all those who have been highly successful in great ventures and in the pursuit of great learning must have successfully undergone three stages. The lines which read ‘Last night the west wind shrivelled the green-clad trees; alone I climb the high tower, to gaze at the road stretching to the horizon’ represent the first stage. The lines which read ‘I have no regrets as my girdle grows looser on my waist; with everlasting love I pine for you’ represent the second stage. The lines which read ‘I have sought her in the crowd a hundred, a thousand times; suddenly turning back my head, I see her under the dimming lanterns’ represent the third stage. It is impossible to skip over to the last stage without experiencing the first two. It is also the case with literature. Hence a literary genius ought to have an incredible amount of cultural cultivation. (Wang 1906 “Wenxue Xiao Yan” [Notes on Literature])

A similar remark is contained in Wang Guowei’s Renjian Cihua, a selection of his poetic remarks in the human world. Although his use of the renowned lines from Song Dynasty ci lyrics was startling, we can examine their implications in his thought. The depiction as a whole is intended to indicate a process of personal development. The first stage suggests painstaking endeavours to learn and to broaden one’s perspective; the second stage shows the perseverance in practice for further improvement; and the last stage expresses the joy of complete enlightenment and the attainment of real creativity in literary ventures. Together they remind us of the two sources from which Wang Guowei drew his inspiration. The first source was Schopenhauer’s stratification of authors into three classes (Schopenhauer 1897 “On Authorship,” p.45). The numerous authors of the first class write without thinking, but produce their work from a full memory or base them on the books of other people. Authors of the second class think while writing or think in order to write. There is no lack of them. Rarely there are authors of the third class, who think before they begin to write. Wang Guowei’s second source was Nietzsche’s description of the metamorphoses of the spirit from a camel via a lion to a child. (Thus Spake Zarathustra in Nietzsche 1976) Symbolically, “the camel” signifies the stage of learning, tolerance and hard work; “the lion” signifies the stage of conquest, mastery and rediscovery of existent values; and “the child” signifies a new beginning and the creation of new values. For Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Wang Guowei, the ultimate stage of their schemes reflected genius in its aspects of creativity, uniqueness, originality and exemplariness.

The Refined as the Second Form (guya shuo)

Although Wang Guowei took literary invention to be the enterprise of genius alone (e.g. Wang 1906 Wenxue Xiaoyan [Notes on Literature]), as a critic and poet he had wider encounters with creative works. Among the men of letters, only a few were naturally gifted with genius, but he saw that the works of others could be equally appealing and aesthetically significant. The haunting question of how this could be so led to his hypothesis of guya as the secondary form of artistic creation.

“There are certain objects in the world that are neither original artworks nor practically useful stuff. Their producer is by no means a genius. However, works of this kind seem to have little difference from what is created by a genius. It can be called guya since there is no ready name for it.” (Wang 1907 “Guya Zhi Zai Meixue Shang Zhi Diwei” [On the Position of the Refined in Aesthetics]).

The term guya combines two Chinese characters: gu (ancient or age-old) and ya (grace or elegance). Wang Guowei took the term as a whole and according to context he used it mainly for a kind of classical gracefulness or refined elegance in art. We may render guya as the refined. Wang Guowei offered guya as a kind of creativity in contrast with genius and as an aesthetic category in contrast with the beautiful and the sublime. He characterised guya in terms of its basic traits: As a kind of artistic creation, guya is produced not by a genius, but by learned person of high personality. Hence its production depends on personal effort rather than on natural talent. As a kind of artistic form, guya is available solely in art and is thus distinct from the beautiful and the sublime, which are found in nature as well as in art. As a kind of aesthetic value, guya is independent to the extent that it does not possess the properties of the beautiful and the sublime. As a kind of technique, guya brings refinement or elegance into what is not beautiful in nature, for example in landscape painting. As a kind of aesthetic object, guya is subject to a posteriori judgment that is based on experience, in contrast to the universal and a priori judgment of the transcendental aesthetic categories of the beautiful and the sublime. (Ibid.)

To facilitate understanding of guya as a new category of art, further clarification is required. First, Wang Guowei understood form in a broad sense. He asserted that all beauty is by definition formal beauty that lies in the symmetry, variety and harmony of form. For example, the hero and his situation provide the subject matter of a novel or drama, but this subject matter can arouse aesthetic feelings only through adequate form. Only this form, which is distinct from the subject matter, can become an aesthetic object. There are generally two types of form. What is expressed naturally and perfectly in the primary form will produce an aesthetic object of either youmei (the beautiful) or zhuangmei (the sublime), and what is skilfully represented in the secondary form will produce an aesthetic object of guya (the refined). In this regard, form transforms something into an aesthetic object by arousing or provoking aesthetic feelings, but employs the subject matter as its content.

Secondly, guya (the refined) is proposed as the secondary form as a counterpart to the primary form, which comprises both youmei (the beautiful) and zhuangmei (the sublime). The subdivisions of the first form, as formulated by Burke and Kant, exclusively represent the creative output of genius and provide other artists with exemplary models for mimesis. In contrast, an artwork of guya is produced by an artist who is not a genius, but who has highly cultivated aesthetic taste. This taste emerges naturally from learning, imitating and refining. An artist who produces guya can be identified with artists of the first calibre in respect of what he makes. Nevertheless, his works are generally fashioned and refined far more by his effort than by his innate talent.

Thirdly, guya is thought to have an independent value. It helps to increase the beauty of the beautiful even though it lacks the properties inherent in either youmei (the beautiful) or zhuangmei (the sublime). By being “a special mode of formal beauty”, guya serves as an indispensable element in the first form of the beautiful and the sublime. In this context, guya is the necessary method, skill or technique without which beautiful or sublime artworks cannot be produced.

Finally, we must approach the concept of guya with reference to the concept of tiancai (genius). In aesthetic creation, there is a complimentary relation between the two. So rare is the artistic genius who offers works of originality and exemplariness. To fill the gaps between artists of genius, there are artists who can produce guya as excellent works of paramount aesthetic value that supplement the output of genius. As supplementary works of art, guya does not negate the worth of works produced on the model of the original and exemplary products of genius. Rather, guya confirms the need for learning, experience, taste and endeavour in the process of artistic creation. It is in this connection that guya has its independent value.

In spite of such explanations, guya still seems perplexing and, in some cases, self-defeating. Take for example the distinction between the primary form and the secondary form. The former is held to comprise youmei (the beautiful) and zhuangmei (the sublime) in both nature and art and thus has two varieties: the natural and the artistic. It (the primary form) in its artistic variety is supplemented by the secondary form guya, which is available only in art and is hence only an artistic form. On this account, the beauty of all things is formal and should thus be capable of being increased when expressed through the second form, but this contradicts the claim that guya is available solely in art and not in nature. Wang Guowei needs an explanation of why this restriction is not arbitrary. His essay on guya as the refined in aesthetics finds a blend of different ingredients. His recipe for guya stays thought-provoking and especially encouraging to artists who lack genius. From a hermeneutic standpoint, however, the westernized delineation of his concept of guya hinders its reception and popularity in China.

Some Chinese critics treated guya so literally that they separated the term into gu and ya for interpretation. They saw gu (ancient, age-old) as the antonym of jin (今，present-day, modern) and saw ya (elegant, cultivated) the antonym of su (vulgar, popular). Accordingly, works of gu and ya were assumed to belong exclusively to classical or high art, which is appreciated by a cultivated minority and has nothing to do with present-day reality. Works of jin and su were seen to be typical of mass or popular art, which was appreciated by the vulgar majority and reflected present-day circumstances. On this basis, Wang Guowei was labelled as a conservative or elitist, and his doctrine of guya (the refined) was condemned for being estranged from reality and life and for being antagonistic to both the social aspect and the mass appreciation of the beautiful. (cf. Chen Yuanhui, 1990 pp.71-5) This critique ignored the contextual implications that I have mentioned and thus failed to answer Wang Guowei’s actual views. The criticism was also arbitrary in light of Wang Guowei’s stance toward high and popular art. In his historical review of Chinese drama and opera, he provided a pioneering study of a genre of art that scholars previously considered unrefined and unworthy of serious consideration. In an opening remark for this study, he showed his appreciation of both high art and this popular genre:

“Each era has its own literature; just like the shi poetry (in the Tang Dynasty, the ci lyrics in the Song Dynasty, and the qu songs or drama in the Yuan Dynasty, literature of a specific kind only flourishes during its own phase and cannot be revived continuously in later ages.” (Wang 1912 Song-Yuan Xiqu Kao [A Historical Study of the Drama in the Song and Yuan Dynasties])

Noticeably, Wang Guowei’s evolutionary view of literary development was free from any restriction to the classical or any bias against the popular. Critiques of his elitist stance in this regard sound out of place or far-fetched at least.

The Theory of poetic State par Excellence (jingjie shuo)

Compared with his other essays on art and literature, Wang Guowei’s Renjian Cihua (Poetic Remarks in the Human World) has a special importance. The notion of jingjie (the poetic state) that it formulated was an aesthetic touchstone on his path of thought.

Renjian Cihua is made up of 64 small sections. Its structure can be divided into two major parts: theoretical pondering and practical criticism. Sections 1 to 9 are devoted to a theoretical discussion of jingjie, and the remaining sections give examples of creating and appreciating jingjie in literary praxis through sample texts (Ye Jiaying 1997 pp.186-8). Jingjie is conventionally taken to be a Chinese rendering of the Sanscrit word Visaya, which was used in Buddhist sutras to mean the scope of sense perception or the characteristic of sense experience. This original meaning has become extended in complex ways, with implications such as jiangjie (boundary), zaoyi (academic or artistic attainment), jingxiang (scene or site) and yijing (the mood, state or significance of an artwork).

Against this background, Wang Guowei used jingjie as a term in literary criticism for the essential quality of art. On some occasions he used jingjie interchangeably with yijing, and they are taken as equivalents by many Chinese scholars. I shall follow this precedent and translate jingjie as the poetic state par excellence. For Wang Guowei, jingjie was “the most important element in a consideration of ci lyrics”.

“If a ci lyric has jingjie, it will naturally achieve a lofty form and naturally possess eminent lines. The unique excellence of ci lyrics of the Five Dynasties and Northern Song periods rests precisely on this point… The poetic state is not limited to scenery and objects alone. Pleasure and anger, sorrow and joy are also a sort of jingjie in men’s hearts. Therefore, those poems that describe true scenes and objects (zhen jingwu), true emotions and feelings (zhen ganqing), can be said to possess jingjie. Otherwise, they may be said to lack jingjie. ‘Red apricot blossoms along the branch, spring feelings stir.’ With that one word ‘stir’ (nao), the jingjie of the poem is completely expressed. ‘As the moon breaks through the clouds, flowers play with their shadows.’ With that one word ‘play’ (nong), the jingjie of the poem is fully expressed.” (Wang 1908 Renjian Cihua [Poetic Remarks in the Human World] as translated in Rickett, 1977, p. 42)

Elsewhere in discussing Chinese drama, Wang Guowei used yijing instead of jingjie:

“The subtlety of literary works can be summed up in one phrase: having yijing. Then what is yijing? It is in the expression of qing (feelings) that is heart-stirring and mind-freshening, in the description of jing (scenes) that is vivid and engaging, and also in the narrative of shi (events) that is lucid and authentic as though coming straight from the mouth [of a good story teller]. It is unexceptionally true of all the best pieces among the ancient shi and ci poems. It is also the case with the qu songs of the Yuan Dynasty.” (Wang 1912 Song-Yuan Xiqu Kao [A Historical Study of the Drama in the Song and Yuan Dynasties], p. 389)

According to the first quotation, jingjie or yijing must have two sorts of components: zhen jingwu (true or authentic scenes and objects) and zhen ganqing (true or sincere emotions and feelings). In the second quotation, we notice similar things: qing (feelings) -- as the shortened form of ganqing, jing (scenes) - as the shortened form of jingwu, and shi (events). All of these elements, when woven together and expressed in an artwork, should be true and sincere, vivid and touching, natural and suggestive; their presence without these merits would not make sense in terms of jingjie. Qing or ganqing (emotions and feelings) are subjective, while jing or jingwu (scenes and objects) and shi (events) are objective. Hence jingjie can be seen as a fusion of the subjective and objective aspects of experience. According to some theorists, jingjie, like yijing, is “an artistic integration of yi and jing”, where yi stands for qingyi (feelings and affections) and jing stands for jingwu (scenes and objects) . (Li Zehou 1983, pp. 161-174) According to Chen Yong, jingjie is “the distinctive imagery in art” that involves “the emotional substance” and “the specific atmosphere”. It stems from an artistic expression of how an objective scene or event is reflected and contemplated in the mind or aesthetic sensibility of the poet. (ChenYong 1983, pp.210-214) For Ye Jiaying, jingjie is a special term in literary criticism that emphasizes “the characteristic of genuine feelings and lively expressions. Feelings of this kind incorporate both inner and outer affective dimensions”. Jingjie of this kind may well indicate either a real scene of sensory perception or a poetic vision of imaginative association. (Ye Jiaying 1983, pp. 147-159) The most frequently discussed definition of jingjie was proposed by Li Zehou: “As shown in Wang Guowei’s usage, jingjie can be called yijing…It is a higher category than xingxiang (image) and qinggan (feelings) in aesthetics, for it conjoins both image and feelings”. Serving as the basis for yijing, xingxiang (image) signifies not only xingsi (resemblance in form) but also shensi (likeliness in spirit). Qinggan (feelings) not only refers to qing (as the emotional aspect, but also implies li as the intellectual aspect concerning truth, concepts and intrinsic laws or norms. The emotional aspect would become extremely wild without the mediation of the intellectual aspect. Yijing, as the poetic state par excellence, can therefore be defined as “the unity of yi and jing, where the former (yi) is the fusion of qing (the emotional aspect) with li (the intellectual aspect), and the latter (jing) is the fusion of xing (resemblance in form) and shen (likeliness in spirit). In other words, yijing is the bearing of uniting artistically objective scenes or events with subjective feelings and interest”.

In spite of all these efforts at interpretation, we cannot easily locate yijing or jingjie by means of a single definition. The mist of its subtlety and ambiguity can be lifted to some extent by examining Wang Guowei’s following illustrations of jingjie as the poetic state par excellence:

1. The creative state versus the descriptive state

In poetry there are both the creative state (zaojing) and the descriptive state (xiejing). This is the basis of the distinction between idealists and realists. However, it is difficult to make a differentiation between the two because the state (jing) which the great poets create must accord with what is natural (ziran), and the state which they simply describe must approach the ideal (Wang in Rickett, trans., 1977 p. 40).

This distinction is made from the perspective of producing artworks. The creative state, which is usually embodied in the works of idealists or romantics, employs mechanisms such as imagination, invention, exaggeration and the grotesque to express subjective feelings and to characterize ideal models of society or romantic fantasies. The descriptive state, which is often reflected in the works of realists, represents and exposes a picture of the reality or actuality of the human condition. Yet, both the creative state and the descriptive state naturally share the common pursuit of the poetic state par excellence (jingjie).

2. The state of self-involvement versus the state of self-detachment

In poetry there are both the state of self-involvement (you wo zhi jing) and the state of self-detachment (wu wo zhi jing). Self-involvement is present in the lines: “With tear-filled eyes I ask the flowers, but they do not speak. Red petals swirl past and swing away.” In contrast, self-detachment is implied in the lines: “I pluck chrysanthemums by the eastern fence, far distant appear the southern mountains.” In a state of self-involvement, the poet views objects in terms of himself or egoism, and everything therefore takes on his own colouring. In a state of self-detachment, the poet views objects per se, and one cannot tell what should be ascribed to the poet himself and what to the object. The state of self-detachment can be attained only in complete quietude. The state of self-involvement is attained in the quiet that follows a conscious act. The former is beautiful, and the latter is sublime (Wang in Rickett, trans., 1977 p. 41-2).

Wang Guowei drew a parallel between these two seemingly distinct states largely in terms of aesthetic appreciation. The self-involving state (you wo zhi jing) employs a self-identification with the object that is subjective and emotional and appears highly personified. It bears some analogy to the condition of empathy that Lipps depicts in his Spatial Aesthetics. In the state of self-detachment (wu wo zhi jing), the self is so deeply lost in the object that it seems to disappear. The state of self-detachment is therefore more poetically subtle, natural, harmonious and suggestive than the state of self-involvement. However, the difference between the two states is quantitative rather than qualitative. The state of self-involvement tends more to be “a state with an explicit self” (xian) whereas the state of self-detachment is a more “a state with an implicit self” (yin) (Zhu Guangqian. “Shi De Yin Yu Xian” [Of the Implicit and Explicit State in Poetry], in Yao Kefu [ed., 1983], pp. 87-9).

The state of self-detachment can be further explored in terms of the chan (zen) Buddhist concept of being desire-free (wu nian) or Schopenhauer’s concept of the pure subject of knowledge. A person in the state of self-detachment would detach himself from any differentiation between subject and object and contemplate things in a purely objective manner. There is surely a hidden connection in this regard.

3. The great poetic state and the minor poetic state

Jingjie as the poetic state may be either large or small, but one cannot use this as a basis for determining the excellence or inferiority of a poem. Why cannot [the poetic state] in lines such as “Little fish jump in the fine rain; swallows dip their wings in the faint breeze” stand in comparison with that in the lines “The large banners glow in the setting sun; horses neigh in the rustling wind.”? Why is not [the poetic state] in lines such as “The pearled curtain idly hangs on the little silver hook” as impressive as that in the lines “Mist enfolds the tower and pavilion; the moon shines dimly on the ferry”? (Wang in Rickett (trans.) 1977, pp.42-3; cf. Wang 1970, p.5)

In the first example, the fish and swallows are small in size, and the rain and breeze are pleasingly gentle. These images suggest not only smallness and gentleness, but also playfulness, delight, delicacy and peace. According to Wang Guowei, the lines contain small jingjie. In contrast, the banners and horses are large in size, and the sun and wind are dynamically powerful. These images imply greatness, power, a grand battlefield, excitement, motivating drive, pressure, and even terror. According to Wang Guowei, the lines contain large jingjie. Both sets of lines are aesthetically appealing and equally expressive, no matter what kinds of objects or scenes are presented in the poems. With reference to Edmund Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, we can say that the small type of jingjie shares certain features with the category of the beautiful and that the large type of jingjie shares certain features with the category of the sublime.

4. The veiled and the non-veiled

We can also distinguish between the poetic state as veiled (ge) and as non-veiled (buge). According to Wang Guowei, the veiled poetic state is weak in scenic description and leads us to approach some poems as if we were viewing flowers through a mist. Rather, the artistic excellence of lines such as “Spring grasses come to life beside the pond” and “Swallows drop bits of mud from the desolate beams” lies in their not being obstructed by a veil. In ci lyrics, it is just the same. For example, the first stanza of Ouyang Xiu’s ci poem to the tune of “Shao Nien You” (A Youth’s Wandering) contains the lines:

Against the twelve zig-zag railings I lean along in spring,

The clear azure stretches far to the clouds.

A thousand miles, ten thousand miles,

The second month, the third month,

To think of travel distresses the heart.

“Each image is directly there and is not obstructed by a veil. When we come to other lines in the same poem, such as: “Beside the pond of Xie Lingyun, on the river-bank of Jiang Yan,” we find that we are looking through a veil.” (Wang in Rickett (trans.) 1977, pp.56-57; cf. Wang 1970, pp. 26-27)

The reason that the last two lines are veiled is the use of two allusions. One refers us to Xie Lingyun’s description in the line: “Spring grasses come to life beside the pond”. The other is related to Jiang Yan’s description in On Parting (Bie fu):

The spring grasses blue-green in hue,

Spring water all waves of green.

As I see you off on the southern shore,

What hurt, ah, what pain!

The original lines are direct and vivid, while the lines alluding to them are indirect and bewildering, as if they were veiled. The first stanza cited demonstrates an intuitively natural style with elements from sensory experience and immediate perception. The other two lines that Wang Guowei saw as veiled reveal a contemplative style with allusions for rational and associative inference.

For Wang Guowei, veiled poetry mainly embodied a pedantic use of allusions, over-decorative phrases and a pretentious style that deprives the reader of sincere feelings and vicarious experience. Non-veiled poetry is available through the natural expression of real feelings and scenes that enables the reader to attain intuitive apprehension and profound appreciation (Ye Jiaying 1997 p. 220). This capacity is in accord with the chief qualities of jingjie that rest on the representation of both sincere feelings and emotions (zhen qinggan) and true scenes and objects (zhen jingwu). “Only when ‘sincere feelings and emotions’ as the soul are blown into the fine imagery of ‘true scenes and objects’ as the body, can the unique charm of the poetic state (jingjie) be fully displayed. Hence ‘sincere feelings and emotions’ can be conceived of as the life of the poetic state whilst ‘true scenes and objects’ [can be conceived of] as the manifestation and symbolization of this life.” (Zhang Bennan, 1992, pp.231-2).

It is no wonder Wang Guowei quoted Nietzsche for emphasis: “If all that is written, I love only what a man has written with his blood. [Write with blood, and you will experience that blood is spirit.]” (Thus Spake Zarathustra, Part I in Nietzsche 1976). This metaphorically denotes that the successful making of jingjie in poetry is by no means an easy task because it calls for painstaking efforts along with creative power and heart-felt sincerity, etc.

The final analysis of jingjie as a special aesthetic category can be viewed holistically through the complex distinctions that I have suggested. Jingjie is concerned with style, imagery, mechanism, aesthetic value, significant form, truth content, criteria of judgement and the creative activity of poetry, but all for the sake of “the investigation of the nature of art in general”. (Nie Zhenbin, 1997, p.139)

Wang Guowei’s doctrine of jingjie was deeply rooted in the rich soil of Chinese philosophy of criticism and blossomed in that context. His views can be traced back to Zhuangzi’s speculation of yan (words) and yi (meanings) and then down to Wang Changling, Yan Yu, Wang Shizhen, Liu Xizai and others who have thought about shijing (the poetic realm) or yijing (the significant state). Wang Guowei’s debt to this tradition is evident, for instance, in his comment:

“In his Canglang Shihua (Canglang’s Poetic Discourse), Yan Yu said: ‘The poets of the Golden Tang period were concerned only about inspiration and interest (xingqu). Like the antelope that hangs by its horns leaving no discernible traces on the ground, their excellence lay in their crystal-like transparency, no more to be grasped than a sound in empty space, the changing colour in a face, the moon in the water or an image in a mirror. The words had a limit, but the meaning went on forever.’ However, what Yan Yu called inspiration and interest and what Wang Shizhen called spirit and tone (shenyun) only seem to touch the surface, while the term of two characters, jingjie, which I have chosen really probe the fundamentals of poetry.” (Wang in Rickett, trans., p.43)

This interconnection with Chinese aesthetic tradition is strong as Wang himself stood on the shoulders of the preceding critics. In reality he was mainly inspired by the insights of Yan Yu’s theory of “inspiration and interest” (xingqu) and Wang Shizhen’s theory of “spirit and tone” (shenyun). Yet, he played them down because he considered jingjie the most essential of poetic creation and its aesthetic values. Thus in his mind jingjie accommodates within itself both xingqu as an aesthetically touching and enlightening effect of poetry and shenyun as a stylistic outcome or magic power of imagery. Moreover, xingqu implies a subtle enlightenment in connection with the mystic chan (zen) whereas shenyun indicates an obscure contemplation of the poetic style in terms of qingyuqn (exquisiteness and far-reachingness). Therefore neither of them could be specifically formulated owing to their vagueness and ambiguity. Relatively, jingjie can be described, as Wang believed, in more tangible terms such as “authentic scenes” and “sincere feelings”, for instance. It is therefore treated by some readers as a so-called unity of the subjective and the objective, the ideal and the real, the emotional and the natural.

In addition, Wang Guowei enlarged the scope of jingjie both through his writing and aesthetic judgment and through his capacity to absorb relevant elements from western sources. His account of jingjie has reminded many Chinese scholars of its possible association with Schiller’s concept of “the aesthetic State” as elaborated in his 27th letter. But in the specific context of Schiller’s thought, the concept was intended to idealize things such as aesthetic culture, aesthetic man, and the cultivated taste involved in “the aesthetic State”. It was related primarily to a concern for the advantages of aesthetic education rather than to a concern for the principles of artistic creation and appreciation.

Schiller’s impact on Wang Guowei extended more to his other theories concerning aesthetic education (meiyu shuo), spiritual detachment (jietuo shuo) and art as play (youxi shuo) than to his doctrine of the poetic state (jingjie shuo). Rather there is a more direct link between jingjie and Geist (spirit or mind) as presented in Kant’s Critique of Judgement:

“Of certain products which are expected, partly at least, to appear as beautiful art, we say that they are without spirit; and this, although we find nothing to censure in them as far as taste goes. A poem may be very pretty and elegant, but is without spirit…Even of a woman, we well say, she is pretty, affable and refined, but without spirit. What then do we mean by spirit? “Spirit” (Geist) in an aesthetic sense, signifies the animating principle in the mind. But that whereby this principle animates the psychic substance (Seele) -- the material which it employs for that purpose that which sets the mental powers into a purposively swing, i.e., into a play which is self-maintaining and which strengthens those powers for such activity. Now my proposition is that this principle is nothing else than the faculty of presenting aesthetic ideas.” (Kant 1951, pp. 156-7)

Whatever their differences, both jingjie and Geist are chiefly concerned with the essence, vitality and significance of art.

In short, Wang Guowei developed his theory of jingjie not only as an ultimate measure of literary value, but also as an ideal of artistic creation. However, his account fails to offer any easily intelligible definition or systematically coherent clarification. Jingjie is like an eel that the reader may assume to have caught, only to find that it has slipped through his fingers. Hence, a contextual reading is required to gain greater confidence in understanding and assessing jingjie as the poetic state par excellence.

To sum up, we see that the structure of Wang Guowei’s philosophy of literary criticism is largely built upon six doctrines. The first four doctrines are concerned with aesthetic education, spiritual exoneration, aesthetic play and the artist as genius. Although they were all borrowed or transplanted from the west with minor modifications, the enlightenment that they brought to China remains a significant feature of Chinese intellectual and aesthetic culture. In striking contrast is the light that has flowed from his theoretical consideration of guya and jingjie. His individual contribution is best exemplified in his investigation of jingjie, which at the beginning of the twentieth century marked the end of classical Chinese literary criticism and the beginning of modern Chinese aesthetic thought. Jingjie (theory of poetic state) can be also seen as fruit of the tree of intercultural transformation, which invites care and cultivation today.

Bibliography

Works of Wang Guowei

Wang Guowei, Wang Guowei Wenji (Collected Works of Wang Guowei). (ed.s Yao Ganming & Wang Yan). Beijing: Zhongguo Wen Shi Chubanshe, 1997, vols.1-4.

_____, Wang Guowei Wenxue Meixue Lunzhu Ji (Wang Guowei’s Anthology on Literature and Aesthetics). (ed. Zhou Xishan).Taiyuan: Beiyue Wenyi Chubanshe, 1987.

_____, Wang Guowei Meilun Wenxuan (Wang Guowei’s Selected Essays on Beauty). (ed. Liu Gangqiang), Changsha: Hunan Renmin Chubanshe, 1987.

_____, Wang Guowei Xueshu Wenhua Suibi (Selected Essays of Wang Guowei). (ed. Fo Chu), Beijing: Zhongguo Qing Nian Chubanshe, 1996.

References in Chinese

Beijing University, Department of Philosophy (ed.), Zhongguo Meixueshi Ziliao Xuanji (A Source Book of the History of Chinese Aesthetics).Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1985.

Cai Yuanpei, Cai Yuanpei Meixue Wenxuan (Cai Yuanpei’s Selected Essays on Aesthetics). Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1983.

Chan Hongxiang, Wang Guowei Zhuan (A Biography of Wang Guowei). Beijing: Tuan Jie Chubanshe, 1998.

Chen Yinque, “Wang Jingan Yishu Xu” (Preface to Wang Guowei’s Posthumous Works 1934). Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, reprinted 1940.

Chen Yong, “Luetan Jingjie Shuo” A Note on the Theory of Jingjie), in Yao Kefu’s Renjian Cihua ji Pinglun Huibian，pp.210-214.

Chen Yuanhui, Lun Wang Guowei (A Study of Wang Guowei). Changchun: Dongbei Normal University Press, 1989.

Fo Chu, Wang Guowei Shixue Yanjiu (A Study of Wang Guowei’s Poetics). Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1987.

Li Zehou, “Yijing Qiantan”(An Initial Enquiry into the Theory of Yijing), in Yao Kefu’s Renjian Cihua ji Pinglun Huibian, pp.160-178.

Li Zehou, Meixue Lunji (Essays on Aesthetics). Shanghai: Shanghai Wenyi Chubanshe, 1980.

Liu Kesu, Shihang Guyan: Wang Guowei Biezhuan (A Solitary Wild Goose: A Separate Biography of Wang Guowei). Beijing: Huaxia Chubanshe, 1999.

Liu Xuan, Wang Guowei Pingzhuan (A Critical Biography of Wang Guowei). Nanchang: Baihuazhou Wenyi Chubanshe, 1996.

Lu Shanqing, Wang Guowei Wenyi Meixue Guan (Wang Guowei’s Artistic and Aesthetic Views).Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin Chubanshe, 1988.

Nie Zhenbin, Wang Guowei Meixue Sixiang Pingshu (Critique of Wang Guowei’s Aesthetic Ideas). Shenyang: Liaonig University Press, 1997.

Ye Jiaying, “Dui Renjian Cihua zhong Jingjie Yici zhi Yijie de Tantao” (About the Definitions of Jingjie as a Term in Wang Guowei’s Poetic Remarks in the Human World), in Yao Kefu’s Renjian Cihua ji Pinglun Huibian. pp. 147-159.

Ye Jiaying, Wang Guowei Jiqi Wenxue Piping (Wang Guowei and His Literary Criticism). Shijiazhuang: Hebei Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1997.

Yao Kefu (ed.), Renjian Cihua Ji Pinglun Huibian (Selected Essays on Wang Guowei’s Poetic Remarks in the Human World). Beijing: Shumu Wenxian Chubanshe, 1983.

Zhang Bennan, Wang Guowei Meixue Sixiang Yanjiu (A Study of Wang Guowei’s Aesthetics).Taiwan: Wenjin Press, 1992.

Zhu Guangqian, Zhu Guangqian Meixue Wenji (Zhu Guangqian’s Collected Works on Aesthetics). vol. II, Shanghai: Shanghai Wenyi Chubanshe, 1982.

References in English

Burke, Edmund, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.

Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Judgment. (tr. J. B. Bernard), New York: Hafner Press, 1951.

Nietzsche, F., The Portable Nietzsche. (tr. & ed. Walter Kaufmann). Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,1976.

Rickett, Adele Austin (tr.), Wang Kuo-wei抯 Jen-Chien Tz抲-Hua: A Study in Chinese Literary Criticism. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1977.

Schiller, Friedrich, On the Aesthetic Education of Man. (tr. E. M. Wilkinson & L. A. Willoughby) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Schopenhauer, Arthur, The World as Will and Idea. (tr. R. B. Haldane & J. Kemp) London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1883, rep. 1964.

_____, The Art of Literature (tr. T. Bailey Saunders). London & New York: Swan Sonnenschein & The MacMillan Press, 1897.

Wang Kuo-wei, Poetic Remarks in the Human World. (tr. Ching-I Tu), Taiwan: Chung Hwa Book Company, 1970.